ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Recent high-profile Chapter 9 bankruptcies like Detroit's and Stockton's have featured contested hearings on confirmation. 1 The confirmation hearings for these cities have been highlighted by battles among groups of creditors, particularly ones between retirees (or their proxy) with their pension claims, and bondholders with their unsecured Service feasibility asks whether the services provided by the city following confirmation of its plan will be adequate for its residents. Adjudication of service feasibility is more challenging than any other criterion for confirmation. The baseline of services that residents are entitled to expect is uncertain, and the extent of services that will be provided following confirmation for years into the future is unclear. While states regularly provide their cities with a variety of powers, they do not provide a comparable list of municipal duties. Nor does the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, the extent of municipal services following confirmation depends on a variety of factors that cannot be known at the time of confirmation.
This raises several questions: Will the municipal government have the skill and long-term political will to implement the plan in the face of economic and democratic challenges? Will the needs of municipal residents stay the same? Will municipal revenue remain adequate for those needs? 10 City residents should be heard on service feasibility. Residents are parties in interest on this issue, even though they may not be able to point to an impending pecuniary loss. They are nonetheless among the stakeholders who will bear the burden of a city's insolvency. The standing of municipal residents finds warrant in the notion that the bankruptcy discharge is a public right. 11 Moreover, the significance of service feasibility, its inexact baseline, its future uncertainty, and the diffuse nature of city residents make it appropriate to appoint an official committee on their behalf. 12 The limitations within Chapter 9 with respect to interference with municipal governance limit the issue on which a residents' committee has standing to service feasibility alone. Within that limit, however, the debtor municipality should bear the expenses of its committee of residents.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies the resources by which to identify the baseline of services that a city must provide. Without such a baseline, feasibility is a moving and uncertain target. Part II addresses a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to consider the nonpecuniary interests of residents. The interests of municipal residents may not satisfy the Article III case-or-controversy requirement. 13 Confirmation of a Chapter 9 plan, however, is a public right.
14 As an Article I tribunal, a bankruptcy court may legitimately consider the concerns of a wide range of Id parties in interest whose Article III standing might be questioned, including municipal residents. Finally, Part III of this Article turns to the form and extent of participation by residents. Residents should be represented by an official committee whose expenses are paid by the municipality. Consistent with the limits on the authority of bankruptcy courts, 15 however, the scope of the committee's input must be limited to feasibility and not extend to interference in the political or governmental powers of the city.
I. THE FEASIBILITY BASELINE

A. The Limits of Chapter 9
Chapter 9 explicitly limits the powers of a bankruptcy court in the administration of a municipal bankruptcy. In deference to the Tenth Amendment, § 904 of the Bankruptcy Code 16 provides that the court may not interfere with any political or governmental powers of a city in bankruptcy. 17 Section 903, in turn, locates in the state the power to define the "political or governmental powers" of its municipalities. 18 Thus, a municipal plan cannot be confirmed if it falls short of what a state prescribes for the baseline of services to residents. Conversely, the bankruptcy court cannot substitute its judgment for state law when it comes to the extent of those services. Thus, this Article first examines what services states generally prescribe for their municipal subdivisions, and then identifies heuristics by which the adequacy of those services can be evaluated.
B. Drilling Down on Municipal Services
The concept of service-delivery insolvency (or simply "service insolvency") is of recent vintage in Chapter 9 analysis. It first appeared in Judge Christopher Klein's opinion on the eligibility for Chapter 9 relief of 15. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) ("This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the political or governmental powers of such municipality . . . .").
16. Id. § 904. 17. Id. § 904(1); see also Pryor, Who Pays the Price?, supra note 6, at 83 ("[S]ection 904 of the Bankruptcy Code bars a bankruptcy judge from interfering with the 'political or governmental powers' of a municipality." (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 904(1))). Section 904 also prohibits a court from interfering with "the property or revenues of the debtor," or "the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing property." 11 U.S.C. § § 904(2)-(3).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 903.
the City of Stockton. 19 Section 109(c)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code makes insolvency a requirement of Chapter 9 relief.
20
Even though the Code defines "insolvent" in purely financial terms, 21 Judge Klein held that "the degree of inability to fund essential government services (service delivery insolvency) also inform[s] the trier of fact's assessment of the relative degree and likely duration of cash insolvency." 22 He went on to conclude that Stockton was experiencing service insolvency.
23
Service insolvency was also one of the benchmarks on which Judge Steven Rhodes relied when he concluded that Detroit was eligible for Chapter 9 relief. 24 Judge Rhodes tied the notion of service insolvency to the second of the alternative tests for municipal insolvency: whether a municipality "is unable to pay its debts as they become due." 25 He concluded that the test is prospective and requires consideration of whether a municipality "has sufficient resources to maintain services for the health, safety, and welfare of the community."
26 Examples of Detroit's inability to fund such services included the presence of many nonworking streetlights, multiple abandoned and blighted structures, delayed police-response times, lack of maintenance of fire-department vehicles, closed municipal parks, and obsolete information-technology systems.
27
While these things are no doubt of enormous significance to a city's residents, its failure to address such problems is not evidence of a city's inability to pay debts as they become due. Unperformed municipal services are not debts. For bankruptcy purposes, a debt is a liability on a 19. See Stockton V, 493 B.R. 772, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (defining "service delivery insolvency" as "a municipality's inability to pay for all the costs of providing services at the level and quality required for the health, safety, and welfare of the community"). For a fuller analysis of this opinion, see Pryor, Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 96. 20. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3). 21. Id. § 101(32)(C) ("The term 'insolvent' means . . . with reference to a municipality, financial condition such that the municipality is[] (i) generally not paying its debts as they become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute; or (ii) unable to pay its debts as they become due.").
22. claim, 28 and the failure to deliver municipal services is not a claim. 29 In other words, a city's failure to provide services will very rarely give a resident a legal or equitable remedy against the city or its officeholders. 30 Nothing short of a claim can function as a measure of insolvency.
"Service insolvency" is a useful metaphor, but it is not a standard that should be used to evaluate a city's eligibility for bankruptcy relief. The definition of "insolvent" in the Bankruptcy Code is purely financial, 31 and there is no need to add a nonstatutory element to the multiple factors that the Code requires for Chapter 9.
32
Notwithstanding the irrelevance of service insolvency at the eligibility stage, it can prove crucial when it 28. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) ("The term 'debt' means liability on a claim."). (1) is a municipality; (2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter; (3) is insolvent; (4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and (5) (A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter; (B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter; (C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable; or (D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is avoidable under section 547 of this title. Id. comes to the time of confirmation of the plan. 33 To keep the notions distinct, what has been labeled as "service insolvency" at the eligibility stage of a Chapter 9 case will be called "service feasibility" when applied at the time of confirmation.
Political Resources for Defining Municipal Duties
Unless municipalities have duties to residents within their jurisdictions, there are no services to which the concept of service feasibility can attach, even at the confirmation stage of a Chapter 9 plan. While the extent of municipal powers has been discussed extensively by the judiciary and the academy, 34 there has been virtually no analysis of municipal duties. 35 If the concept of service feasibility is a chimera, it provides no more than a trope for the desires of civic activists. A concept of service feasibility untethered to state law would effectively empower the court to interfere with the governmental and political powers of a municipality. Moreover, if service feasibility has no legal content, it would follow that it should not be part of the plan-confirmation analysis. Political justification for the imposition of duties on American cities, and thus, service feasibility, must therefore be sought in the texts and practices of the American legal tradition.
The American political system has historically eschewed providing a foundation for positive rights.
Beginning with the United States Constitution, there is little warrant for a federal constitutional baseline for municipal services. race-based discrimination in the provision of municipal services do not violate the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
38
The reticence to constitutionalize municipal duties is not surprising, since the United States Constitution is generally void of entitlements.
39
Without explicit entitlements, an alternative resource for constitutional affirmative rights would be their implication from the Constitution's procedural and negative rights. It seems clear, however, that the complex and highly politicized challenges of implying positive rights from negative ones and then policing municipal inaction makes the Constitution an inappropriate resource from which to derive rights to particular municipal services, and is equally unsuited as a baseline for service feasibility. 40 Federal legislation might seem to be a more fruitful resource for deriving duties of local government. 41 Yet even here, where federal-local relations are intertwined, 42 few federal statutes set standards for municipal services as such, apart from conditions attached to receipt of federal funds. Federal statutory and regulatory regimes-apart from spending programsare largely limited to enforcing national commercial or environmental standards or vindicating existing rights. channeled through local governments have an enormously varied reach. 44 Federal statutes do not, however, identify across-the-board levels of service entitlements, and they are typically implemented through a kaleidoscope of state and local legal regimes. 45 State constitutions prove a sturdier basis for municipal duties. As Emily Zackin demonstrates, "[s]tate constitutions contain a plethora of positive-rights provisions that cover a wide range of topics." 46 Among the most frequently included is the right to a free public education. 47 More unexpectedly, many state constitutions contain a variety of labor rights, such as "the right to an eight-hour day, a minimum wage, and protection from blacklisting practices and private armies."
48
Other labor-oriented positive state constitutional rights include laborer's liens, weakening of employer defenses to liability for workplace injuries, and, of course, workers'-compensation systems. 49 More recently, some state constitutions have been amended to encompass a duty to protect the environment.
50
State statutes regularly go beyond constitutional mandates to require local governments to implement building codes, sanitation systems, and other matters.
51
After canvassing these resources, Michelle Anderson ultimately concludes that, notwithstanding insolvency, municipal residents, as a class, are generally "entitled to have a 911 emergency system that dispatches police officers and firefighters, along with solid waste pick up, wastewater treatment, and other basics."
52 Analyzing these core functions, she derives three principal purposes of municipalities, which, in turn, 44 . Id. at 971-73 (listing as areas of "cooperative localism" fields including homeland security, criminal justice, immigration, education, employment, housing, economic development, telecommunications, transportation, and environmental protection).
45. warrant services by which they can be implemented. 53 Those purposes are: "(1) to provide or facilitate services; (2) to hold land and property in the public interest; and (3) to regulate for public health, safety, and welfare." 54 Anderson then identifies sets of specific duties to effect these purposes. Thus, under the broad rubric of services, she finds a mandate to provide those services "most vital to the preservation of life (police, fire, sanitation, public health), liberty (police, courts, prosecutors), property (zoning, planning, taxing), and public enlightenment (schools, libraries)." 55 Provision of infrastructure and public spaces are duties that pertain to the second purpose of local government-to hold land and property in the public trust. 56 The third purpose entails regulation by means of the traditional police powers. 57 Whether residents enjoy additional statespecific rights would involve close examination of the statutes of each state, a task beyond the scope of this Article.
Some might recoil from having such a meager list of positive rights function as the baseline of feasibility in a municipal Chapter 9 case. For some, the nature of modern urban life calls for more than the provision of such a minimal range of municipal services. For example, municipal services such as museums and entertainment venues do not fit neatly into Anderson's list of municipal duties. Nevertheless, in addition to this brief canvass of state law, public-choice theory also supports a relatively narrow understanding of municipal duties, at least under the circumstance of municipal insolvency.
58
Charles Tiebout provided one of the first accounts of the appropriate scope of the obligations of municipal government from an economic perspective. In short, Tiebout argued, municipal government exists to provide local public goods. 59 What constitutes public goods is thus at the center of the baseline of municipal duties and the service aspect of feasibility in Chapter 9. Tiebout succinctly defined a public good as "one which should be produced, but for which there is no feasible method of 53 In other words, public goods are goods (including services) for which there is demand but which will not be supplied due to market failure. The potential for market failure in the context of municipal services comes primarily in the form of "free riders" who would receive the benefits of services without payment. 61 The failure of the market to deliver goods for which providers cannot be assured of payment (or the power to exclude those who do not pay) justifies their provision by government supported by the power to tax. Roads are an example of public goods. Without a guarded toll gate at the end of every driveway, there is no way to charge users for the good of a municipal street. Public-choice theory thus provides a justification for taxing all residents for creating and maintaining roads. Defining public goods in terms of market failure might produce a feasibility baseline that is even smaller in scope than what can be derived from state law. It is unlikely to be significantly larger. 62 Thus, an assertion that feasibility includes a panoply of services in addition to the legal minimum bears a heavy burden of proof.
Drawing on the bricolage of resources described above, bankruptcy courts can identify the baseline necessary to find a plan feasible from the perspective of municipal services. Feasibility requires judicial evaluation of projected postconfirmation municipal expenditures for matters addressed in the state's constitution and legislation. For aspects of other commonly provided municipal services, the court should take care to find their warrant in the state's legal tradition of public health, safety, and welfare-the historical implementation of the police powers. (1986)) (explaining that a "'free rider' problem" exists when "those who make capital contributions towards these services cannot efficiently exclude noncontributors from receiving substantial benefits"). In addition to the free-rider problem, Gillette provides two reasons for market failure: cases where early users would pay a disproportionate share of the initial cost of an improvement that provides a good whose subsequent marginal cost is low (e.g., public water works), and cases where the cost of enforcement of exclusion of free riders is disproportionately high. Id.
62. Id. at 960. Gillette explains: Street paving, street lighting, sewage treatment, garbage collection, as well as monopolies ranging from local transportation to electric utilities, do not fall within the domain of local government solely from tradition. Rather, these became "traditional" local government functions because, left to the private market, they were susceptible to undersupply (for social goods) and oversupply (for social bads).
Id.
warrant other than an accretion of services procured by effective rent seekers, no legal duty to continue their provision exists. In other words, if there is no legal justification for a particular municipal service, the city should not continue to provide the service if it has sought bankruptcy protection. Once the baseline of municipal services has been identified, additional resources must be consulted for standards by which to measure their adequacy.
How Much Risk Must Be Borne?
Evaluating the extent of the financial commitment for municipal duties is even more problematic than identifying them. Standing alone, the duty to provide a particular municipal service does little to determine its adequacy, especially when a city is insolvent. A duty to provide a particular service does not entail its fiscal extent. In other words, how many dollars should a municipality's plan project for satisfying residents' entitlements for a plan to be feasible? 63 Payment of less than the full amount of creditors' claims justifies a concomitant sharing by municipal residents in the risk of insolvency. Like claims of creditors to payment, municipal residents are exposed to a risk of reduction in services. Yet it is possible that reductions in municipal services before bankruptcy have already exposed residents to more than their share of the risk of insolvency. 65. A heuristic has been described as a conceptual tool characterized by "nonalgorithmic, efficient, error-based, purpose-oriented, problem-solving tasks." Jordi Cat, The on municipal services. 66 Even though their application may not result in a specific dollar amount, heuristics can frame the analysis and provide standards other than the court's conscience by which to analyze service feasibility.
67
The resources identified by Professor Anderson begin with a basic efficiency concern: service provision cannot be reduced to the point that tax revenue decreases. 68 For example, if less expenditures for law enforcement would entail more crime, and if more crime would cause more residents to flee, it follows that the tax revenues would decrease, causing a decrease in payments to creditors. Service feasibility blocks implementation of such a downward spiral. Expenditures to the extent necessary to enforce building codes and state-law warranties of habitability, as well as other matters related to public health and safety, such as streetlights, are certainly warranted.
69 Provision for funding the legally identified baseline must be sufficient to ensure that the baseline is achieved. Public expenditures to eliminate urban blight and bring the conditions of older neighborhoods to the standard of contemporary land-use laws may also be considered to evaluate the funding of municipal services. 70 Similarly, comparison to the collective bargaining agreements of comparable cities and regional and statewide average expenditures by category of service will be useful for the 66. Resources for Anderson's heuristics include efficiency and economic perspectives; recognition of a warranty of habitability for neighborhoods; land use and subdivision laws; building codes; environmental regulation; collective bargaining agreements; regional and statewide average service levels; best practices in neighborhood stabilization; and educational adequacy debates. See Anderson, supra note 35, at 1196-1205.
67. See id. at 1195-96 ("This inquiry presents an opportunity to put social contract theory into action-a chance to explore and define the terms on which society expects government to provide services and protection in exchange for individuals' obedience to the state.").
68. Id. at 1196 ("Up to a certain point, services are in both creditors' and residents' interests, because they can protect (or even increase) the property values used as the basis for property tax assessments . . . .").
69. Id. at 1197-98. 70. Id. at 1200. As Anderson explains, For instance, if a city requires one streetlight per fifty feet of sidewalk in a new subdivision of single-family homes, that figure can provide a starting point for a [bankruptcy court] to define the street lighting budget in an existing neighborhood funded in the city's bankruptcy plan. In other words, how much money does the city need to get that number of streetlights operational again? Id. [Vol. 37:161 spending side of feasibility. 71 Use of such heuristics is necessary to avoid substituting the court's predilections for those of the political process.
Especially with the evaluation of the extent of funding for a city's duties, the bankruptcy court risks running afoul of the limits on its powers. Section 903 72 of the Bankruptcy Code reserves the power of state government to control a municipality's governmental powers. To the extent a state has not mandated a particular level of funding for municipal services-as most have not-a city's plan is free to project funding for services as it chooses, but the extent of that funding remains relevant to the plan's feasibility. Excessive funding, even for baseline services, is not in the best interests of creditors. Inadequate funding is not feasible. Confirmation of a plan at either extreme is not warranted.
Section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code 73 also presents an impediment to treating funding of municipal services as an element of feasibility. The bankruptcy court cannot order a decrease or increase in spending on services within the legally required services. The court can, however, refuse to confirm a plan which over-or under-funds those services. 74 Constitutional and congressional limits on a bankruptcy court's powers conflict with the same court's duty to evaluate a plan's feasibility. While the court must be careful not to intrude into matters left to the states, it cannot shirk its duty to evaluate a plan's feasibility.
C. The Limits of the Confirmation Process
A principal foundation of a plan of adjustment is its projections of the future. Distributions to creditors are generally fixed at the time of confirmation, but the sources of payment-whether from tax revenues or transfers from other levels of government-are only projections. So, too, are the levels of future municipal services and their costs. The unfolding of the infinite variety of eventual contingencies makes problematic even the best projection of future municipal expenditures.
Notwithstanding the vagaries in the fortunes of a postconfirmation city, it remains the most important governmental locus in the lives of its residents. 75 The inability to project with certainty the adequacy of funding for baseline services should limit the bankruptcy court's evaluation of their feasibility to the near term only. Built-in increases, however, should be eschewed, because changes in funding should be addressed through the postconfirmation political process. Indeed, a confirmation order binding future city governments to spending increases would cross the line set by § 904 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court may no more interfere with the governmental powers postconfirmation than during the pendency of the case.
76
Plans that automatically implement increases in spending for municipal services should not be confirmed. The postconfirmation political process-not an order confirming a Chapter 9 plan-provides the appropriate means by which to increase spending.
II. FEASIBILITY JURISDICTION
Municipal residents have legitimate expectations of their city.
77
Municipal residents are stakeholders when it comes to provision of municipal services, even if those services are no more than the implementation of state-mandated entitlements. Yet, because municipal residents are not creditors, they have no right to vote on a plan. Taxpayers also are not municipal creditors, but they arguably have standing nonetheless. 78 Taxpayers have a sufficiently concrete interest to object to a plan's feasibility, 79 but what of residents who may not pay any direct taxes to their municipality? While they benefit directly and indirectly from municipal services, is that adequate for standing to be heard on a plan's feasibility?
A. Jurisdiction
A bankruptcy court must have jurisdiction over a Chapter 9 plan if it is to enter a final order confirming it. Article III, Section Two, of the Constitution provides for the exercise of the "Judicial Power" of the United States over "all Cases" arising under the laws of the United States. 80 In turn, Section One limits those who may exercise such power to the 87. See Stern, supra note 84, at 1052 ("Article III purports to describe and vest only 'the judicial Power.' Conducting courts-martial and deciding matters of public rights are matters of executive, not judicial, power. Consequently, Article III and its Section 1 security have nothing to do with them." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1) (emphasis added)).
who adjudicate in courts-martial, administrative agencies, and with respect to matters arising as public rights are simply not exercising the judicial power of the United States encompassed in Section Two of Article III; thus, the requirements of Section One do not apply to them.
Yet, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts is not like courts-martial, which have historically been associated with the executive power.
88
Neither is bankruptcy set apart from the jurisdiction of the United States, like territorial courts. 89 Moreover, bankruptcy courts are not agencies in which the executive makes judicially reviewable decisions in the course of administering a federal program. 90 Thus, a bankruptcy court can enter a final order confirming a Chapter 9 plan only if the Chapter 9 plan is a public right.
Over the course of its evaluation of bankruptcy judges' jurisdictional limits, a majority of the Supreme Court has been careful not to answer whether any part of bankruptcy adjudication is a public right. For instance, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 91 the Court held that a bankruptcy judge did not have the power to enter a judgment in an action for damages for breach of contract brought by a Chapter 11 debtor.
92
According to the plurality opinion, a state-law contract action was clearly a private right. 93 Thus, no person without 88. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 79 (1857) (explaining that the Constitution vests Congress with the power to establish the military, along with its customary usages, including courts-martial); Stern, supra note 84, at 1055 ("[C]ourts-martial do not exercise the judicial power. Instead, they exercise the executive power, the power of a military command to discipline its troops.").
89. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 545-46 (1828) (holding that territorial courts established by Congress pursuant to the Constitution could exercise admiralty jurisdiction because they had nothing to do with Article III); Stern, supra note 84, at 1067-68 ("The courts that Congress establishes for such polities under its control are not truly United States courts. They, like state courts, are courts of their respective polities.").
90. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49-50 (1932) (holding that a federal agency could award compensation against a private employer under a federal act because it functioned as a fact-finder subject to federal court review); see also Stern, supra note 84, at 1073 ("As long as 'judges' with Section 1 security perform all 'judging,' Article III leaves Congress free to constitute courts with subalterns as it sees fit, possibly even filling courts with agents of the executive.").
91. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 92. Id. at 84 ("[T]he cases before us, which center upon appellant Northern's claim for damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation, involve a right created by state law . . . .").
93. Id. at 71-72 (plurality opinion) ("Appellant Northern's right to recover contract damages to augment its estate is 'one of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.'" (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51)). went on to address the public-versus private-right question at length, without reaching a conclusion with respect to bankruptcy law. 105 It seems likely that all members of the Court would agree that Congress could assign to a non-Article III tribunal virtually any claim against the federal government, the quintessential example of a public right. 106 But confirmation of a Chapter 9 plan of adjustment does not involve a matter between an entity and the federal government. May confirmation nonetheless be a public right?
There can be no doubt that the four dissenters in Stern would classify confirmation of a plan as a public right. If, as they concluded, a counterclaim by a debtor against a creditor should be a public right, 107 surely something as central to the process of reorganization as plan confirmation would be a public right. 108 Excluding Justice Scalia, the four members in the Stern majority would probably agree. While the majority expressly declined to decide whether any part of the bankruptcy system might be a public right, 109 it described a two-step analysis by which to make the determination. Adjudication by a judge with Article III tenure is required if two conditions are not met: (1) "[i]f a statutory right is not closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program Congress has power to enact"; 110 and (2) "if that right neither belongs to nor exists against the Federal Government."
111 Reframing the first requirement in the positive, we see that confirmation of a plan is certainly intertwined with Chapter 9, which Congress enacted pursuant to its constitutional bankruptcy power. 112 In other words, plan confirmation "stems from the bankruptcy itself." 113 The relief offered by Chapter 9-the discharge-was not available at common law 114 and exists only "by the grace of the other branches."
115
Confirmation discharges a municipality's preconfirmation debts and substitutes the promises of the plan in their place.
116
As the plurality acknowledged in Northern Pipeline, the discharge is "at the core of the federal bankruptcy power." 117 Thus, despite their continuing reticence, four members of the majority in Stern would likely join the four dissenters and hold that a non-Article III tribunal may enter a final order confirming a plan. 118 Bankruptcy court jurisdiction over confirmation of a Chapter 9 plan ensures that its order confirming the plan is final.
B. Standing
The Article III limits on standing-an allegation of an injury fairly traceable to a defendant's conduct that the court may redress 119 -do not apply when a non-Article III tribunal adjudicates a public right. Enacting uniform laws concerning bankruptcy is among the enumerated powers of Congress, 120 and the discharge is at the center of that power.
121
The constitutional warrant for a bankruptcy judge's order confirming a plan with its concomitant discharge thus comes from congressional action pursuant to Article I of the Constitution; we find in Article II the duty of the President to "take [c] are that the Laws be faithfully executed." 122 Congress's Article I powers and the President's Article II powers operate together as the constitutional fulcrum for the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy judge that exists today. 123 Even without the ability to exercise the judicial power of the United States, bankruptcy judges can implement the joint Article I and Article II powers of Congress and the Executive.
By requiring that the plan be feasible, Congress has given all those within the broad "zone of interests" of a confirmed plan-whom the Bankruptcy Code characterizes as parties in interest-a stake in the process of confirmation. The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.
Id.
122. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 123. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2612 (describing "the public rights exception" in terms of cases "arising 'between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments'" (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932))).
124. 127 An objection by municipal residents to the feasibility of a plan does not implicate the life, liberty, or property of any person. Therefore, a broad notion of standing is appropriate on the issue of feasibility. It is the duty of the Executive to provide an adjudicatory mechanism by which Congress's bankruptcy power may be implemented, and hence to provide all parties in interest, including municipal residents, an opportunity to be heard. Bankruptcy courts are such an adjudicatory mechanism.
The breadth, and even the uncertainty of "party in interest" is precisely appropriate for the work of a non-Article III tribunal. With respect to matters of public right, it is for Congress to decide the scope of the public that has a right to be heard and for the Executive to provide the opportunity. Bankruptcy judges should therefore afford that right to a broad range of persons. An expansive understanding of non-Article III standing is warranted. When service feasibility is the issue, that expansive understanding certainly includes municipal residents.
[T]his is not to say that the pecuniary interest test should be discarded in its entirety. It may be much easier to understand the dynamic when a provision is clearly designed to protect a specific, narrow pecuniary interest and the pecuniary interest test can play an important role in discerning what interests fall within the zone of interests of that provision. But it should be just that-one test designed to assist with the consideration of standing . . . . The problem lies with holding to the erroneous view that this narrow standard is relevant to any interests represented or issues that arise in a case or proceeding. 
III. RESIDENTS' REPRESENTATION
A. Residents' Committees
The interests of municipal residents are exceptionally diverse. Issues concerning the range of legally required services multiplied by the needs of tens or hundreds of thousands of citizens, residents, and entities that have a physical and economic presence in a city make individualized representation impractical. Recognition of a committee of residents is warranted by the incorporation of § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code into Chapter 9.
128
Only rarely will the value of the objections of a single resident on the basis of service feasibility match the cost of effective representation. 129 Collective action is thus a necessary requirement for effective evaluation of service insolvency, but it is not sufficient.
The very rationale proffered by public-choice theory for identifying municipal duties 130 provides the warrant for municipal subsidy of the expenses of a residents' committee. In other words, the expenses of a residents' committee are a public good. Free riders cannot be excluded from the benefits of a committee's efforts, and, without adequate funding, no adequate representation of municipal residents will take place. The requirement of feasibility for confirmation of a plan reinforces the conclusion that these expenses are a public good. Just as confirmation of a plan is a public right warranting participation by noncreditor residents, 131 so, too, are public means to vindicate that right. Existing constituencies with the financial wherewithal to protect their interests-creditors-exist with respect to the other requirements for confirmation. 132 The public interest of service feasibility, by contrast, requires public support.
Detroit's Chapter 9 proceedings have seen an example of such support with the appointment of a feasibility expert. 133 While the court has the power to appoint an expert witness, 134 appointment of a residents' committee with the powers both to select an expert and to advocate its view of service feasibility is more consistent with an adversarial approach to adjudication.
B. Keeping the "Political," Political . . . But Not Too Political
All aspects of service feasibility are deeply political. Identification of the baseline of legally required municipal services, as well as the extent of their funding, are at the center of the political existence of municipalities. 135 Yet, for both constitutional and statutory reasons, the powers of the bankruptcy court are constrained when it comes to "political or governmental" powers of a municipality. 136 The court can maintain the balance between these limitations and the requirement of feasibility by restricting the scope of the committee's powers. Limiting the standing of a residents' committee to the issue of service feasibility "would reduce the risk of turning the Chapter 9 case into a political free-for-all."
137
Even though the virtues of political liberalism should be respected, the "democratic deficit" in municipal elections 138 further warrants appointment of a residents' committee. A committee that reflects the interests of voting and non-voting residents as they pertain to service feasibility is justified because Congress has made feasibility a requirement of confirmation and because "the personal interests of municipal office holders may not coincide with larger groups within the municipality."
139 A committee of residents chosen for the narrow purpose of evaluating service feasibility further ensures the legitimacy of the final result. A vigorous assessment of a plan's feasibility led by residents will reduce subsequent criticism of a plan and increase the likelihood that the plan's implementation will be preserved by the subsequent democratic process. 
CONCLUSION
Every Chapter 9 plan must be feasible to be confirmed. Feasibility includes provision of mandated municipal services. As the recipients or beneficiaries of such services, municipal residents have standing to object to a municipal plan of adjustment on the ground that it is not feasible. First, while the substance of municipal duties are created by state law, the uncertainty of their boundaries entails a role for residents in identifying them. Second, a plan's provisions for funding those services are not susceptible to rule-based evaluation. Thus, municipal residents are entitled to weigh in on the adequacy of services proposed for the postconfirmation city as much as the plan's proponents.
It remains the case that § § 903 and 904 of the Bankruptcy Code limit the powers of the bankruptcy court when it comes to a municipality's exercise of its governmental powers. Such limits on federal power do not, however, eliminate the requirement that a municipality's plan be feasible. Evaluating the services that the municipality plans to provide merely implements state-law identification of municipal duties; it is not an interference with the municipality's political or governmental powers.
The nonpecuniary nature of the interests of residents, even as indirect beneficiaries of municipal services, is not an impediment to their standing to contest a plan's feasibility. The constitutional limits on judicial standing are immaterial when it comes to plan confirmation. Confirmation of a Chapter 9 plan-with the concomitant discharge of indebtedness-is a public right. Thus, the constitutional bankruptcy power granted to the legislative branch increases the range of interests of those who may appear before a non-Article III tribunal. In other words, Congress, not the Constitution, has the power to determine the scope of bankruptcy-related parties in interest.
In addition, the diffuse interests of municipal residents will make appointment of a residents' committee, whose expenses will be borne by the city, appropriate in many large municipal bankruptcies. To the extent that federal courts conclude that municipal residents are not parties in interest, or that they are not entitled to an official committee, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to make such conclusions clear. The requirement that a Chapter 9 plan be feasible is appropriate. Congress should ensure that the issue of feasibility receives the thorough vetting it deserves.
